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The Reality of Addressing God in 
Prayer
W. Graham Monteith
[The]	 tendency	 toward	 an	 intersubjective	 pragmatics	
shows	itself	in	the	work	of	the	leading	philosopher	of	
the Scottish “Common Sense” school, Thomas Reid, 
who	 believed	 that	 the	 most	 important	 function	 of	
language is to perform “social acts” such as promising, 
commanding,	contracting,	or	testifying.1
In	 the	 above	 quotation,	 Angela	 Esterhammer	 maintains	 that	 the	
Scottish	‘Common	Sense’	school	of	the	Enlightenment	brought	about	
a	dynamic	understanding	of	 language	as	being	 social	 and	also	 as	 a	
mode	of	stating	our	 internal	beliefs.	The	purpose	of	 this	paper	 is	 to	
examine	the	nature	of	speech	in	prayer,	that	is,	we	wish	to	reach	an	
understanding	 in	 terms	 of	 speech	 act	 theory.	 The	 central	 problem	
here	is	that	anything	uttered	in	a	prayer	is	addressed	to	God	who	is	
unverifiable and is not addressed to humans who can witness the 
outcome	 of	 the	 speech	 act	 and	 be	 passive	 or	 active	 hearers	 of	 the	
prayer.	There	 is	 understandably	no	mention	of	God	or	 of	 prayer	 in	
the	writings	of	the	major	speech	act	theorists,	J.	L.	Austin	and	J.	R.	
Searle.	Coming	from	a	positivist	background,	it	is	not	surprising	that	






defined as the activity of communicating with a God who is believed 




offered a seminal epistemological understanding of non-verifiable 





can be verified by its effect on another individual or society. This is 
not	possible	in	the	case	of	prayer	because	the	effect	it	has	upon	God	





Thomas	 Reid	 (1710–1796)	 was	 a	 Regent	 at	 King’s	 College,	
Aberdeen where he wrote his first major work. He began a life-
long	dispute	with	David	Hume	after	 taking	up	 a	Chair	 in	Glasgow	





accommodate	 the	 metaphysical.	 The	 solution	 lies	 in	 regarding	 the	
speech	in	prayer	as	a	speech	act	as	understood	by	Reid.	There	are	four	
stages	to	the	argument.	1)	We	must	review	modern	speech	act	theory	
and	 its	 limitations	 regarding	 this	 question.	 2)	Shoshana	 Felman	 in	
her	book,	The Scandal of the Speaking Body,	can	help	to	advance	the	
argument	by	demonstrating	that	speech	acts	may	refer	to	something,	
in this case the flattery of beautiful women by Cervantes’ Don Juan, 
which is unverifiable and intrinsically subjective. 3) A review of speech 
act	theory	and	religion	will	show	that	work	has	been	undertaken	in	this	
field in relation to the notion that God speaks but not how we claim to 




When it comes to examining Austin, it will be sufficient to 
concentrate	 on	 his	 concept	 of	 performatives	 such	 as	 promises	 and	
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legal	prescriptions.	He	outlines	most	of	our	concerns	in	Lecture	V	of	
Doing Things With Words.	Throughout	the	book	there	is	no	mention	
of	God	or	of	prayer.	Austin	recognises	that	when	we	make	a	promise	
we	enter	into	an	act	which	entails	an	outcome	which	normally	will	be	
considered to be the fulfilment of the promise. He talks of promises 
being	‘happy’	by	which	he	means	that	they	are	kept.	Sometimes	the	
word	‘felicitous’	is	used.	In	general,	he	writes:
this	 amounted	 to	 saying,	 if	 you	 prefer	 jargon,	 that	 certain	
conditions have to be satisfied if the utterance is to be happy—
certain	things	have	to	be	so.	And	this,	it	seems	clear,	commits	






dishonesty	or	other	 reasons	 there	may	be	 for	breaking	promises.	 In	
the	 case	 of	 a	 promise	 its	 performative	 value	 is	 totally	 tied	 up	with	
its	conclusion.	The	choice	of	this	particular	example	provides	Austin	





of	 a	 solemn	promise	manifestly	kept	–	 to	 an	 empty	promise	which	
nevertheless	has	meaning	and	substance	–	to	a	promise	made	to	God	
which is both solemn and kept but cannot be verified? The next stage 
in	 the	 argument	 is	 to	 look	 at	 empty	promises.	Felman	 recounts	 the	
tales of Don Juan who constantly flattered women with no sincerity 
beyond	 that	 of	 the	 romantic	moment.	 It	will	 be	 contended	 that	 the	
properties	 of	God	 are	 as	 real	 as	 those	which	Don	 Juan	 admires	 in	
women,	and	 that	because	 the	properties	of	God	are	 real,	 statements	
about	 them	 have	 the	 same	 validity	 as	 other	 subjective	 statements	
which are suggestive of speech acts. Can his flattery be understood as a 
speech	act	in	that	he	was	offering	to	each	woman	some	understanding	
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of beauty and attractiveness and affirming something which she could 
bank	as	an	emotion	and	promise	for	the	future,	only	to	be	betrayed	by	
the shallowness of the affirmation? At first sight there is no truth in 
Don	Juan’s	statements	and	nothing	which	could	afford	them	the	status	
of	truth.	Felman,	however,	argues	thus:	
The source of obligation is displaced here from the first to 
the	second	and	third	persons:	“You	are	not	obliged	 to	me	…	
your beauty is your security.” The constative itself, in Don 






Thus,	 because	Don	 Juan	 has	 a	 subjective	 concept	 of	 beauty	 in	 his	
mind	 and	 is	 addressing	 it	 to	 someone	who	 possesses	 that	 property	
he	 is	 not	 lying,	 however	 despicable	 his	 behaviour	 may	 be.	 “Your	
beauty is your security.” is the first step to recognising that speech 
acts	 may	 be	 addressed	 to	 subjects	 which	 have	 a	 purely	 subjective	
basis.	Schuhmann	and	Smith4	 present	 a	 fairly	 convincing	 argument	
that	 there	were	 early	 signs	 of	 speech	 act	 theory	 in	 Reid’s	writings	
but	 they	preferred	 to	concentrate	on	 the	 idea	 that	 they	were	 ‘social	
acts’	which	stressed	the	action	of	a	promise	between	two	parties	–	one	
spoken,	the	other	received.	They	make	no	mention	of	Reid’s	religious	
beliefs (which they find rather confusing) which are so important in 
the	 understanding	 of	 the	mind	 in	 the	works	 of	Reid.	Nevertheless,	
they	 stress,	 in	 common	with	most	 commentators,	 the	 social	 nature	
of	 language.	 They	 do	 suggest	 that	 Reid	 may	 have	 made	 more	 of	
insincerity and infidelity than either Austin or Searle.
Our	 intention,	 however,	 is	 to	 show	 that	 the	 belief	 that	 one	 is	
communicating	to	God	has	the	same	dynamics	as	the	above	example	
but	 that	 Reid	 offers	 a	 threefold	 understanding	 of	 language	 which	
allows	us	to	assume	that	a	speech	act	is	taking	place	in	prayer	to	a	real	
object	of	belief.	Most	 recent	 literature	 tends	 to	concentrate	on	how	
God	talks	to	humankind.	The	Bible	is	not	only	regarded	as	story	and	
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Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks.	
Wolterstorff	does	not	dwell	upon	Reid	by	name	other	than	to	remind	
his	readers	that	
Thomas	 Reid	 argued	 that	 our	 human	 constitution	 includes	




reality	 in	 themselves.	He	argues	strongly	 in	 favour	of	 the	Common	
Sense	 school	 of	 philosophy.	He	 is	 one	 of	 the	main	 protagonists	 of	
‘Reformed	Epistemology’	and	argues	strongly	that	beliefs	have	their	
warrant	from	the	strength	of	fundamental	beliefs	held	by	individuals	






justified and rational in his doxastic practice. Daniel Robinson, in a 
paper	on	William	James,	points	to	that	author’s	references	to	Reid	in	
his works, and also to what ‘Reid called the “principle of veracity” 
and “the principle of credulity.”’7
The	American	 mathematician	 and	 philosopher	 William	Alston,	
however,	 presents	 the	 most	 cogent	 argument	 for	 a	 modern	 use	 of	
Thomas	Reid.	Some	accuse	Alston	of	developing	a	purely	subjective	
theory	 whilst	 others	 applaud	 his	 internalist	 or	 phenomenological	
approach.	 His	 purpose	 is	 to	 understand	 the	 doxastic	 practices	 of	
believers.	He	begins	by	quoting	many	examples	of	religious	experiences	
page 72
from	 William	 James’	 The Varieties of Religious Experience	8	 and	
develops	an	argument	throughout	the	book	that	such	experiences	have	
an	 existence	which	 gives	 them	 substance	which	 can	 be	 understood	




regarded as real to the believer. In putting aside issues of verification, 
Alston	writes	of	Reid:
…	 one	 reason	 my	 account	 is	 closer	 to	 Reid’s	 is	 that	 Reid	
had	 the	 advantage	 of	 philosophizing	 before	 the	 advent	 of	
verificationist and other antirealist philosophies. Reid never 
suggests	 that	 there	 is	 anything	 unintelligible	 about	 the	 idea	
that,	for	example,	sense	perception	is	or	is	not	reliable,	or	that	
we	cannot	meaningfully	raise	 the	question	of	whether	 this	 is	


























exert	all	 those	operations	of	mind	which	 the	writers	 in	 logic	
and	 pneumatology	 have	 so	 copiously	 described;	 but,	 at	 the	
same	time,	he	would	still	be	a	solitary	being,	even	when	in	a	
crowd	…12	









which	we	 translate	 into	 linguistic	 descriptions	which	we	 can	 share	
with	 others,	 so	 likewise	we	 can	 share	 our	 knowledge	 of	God	with	











by	means	of	 the	 eye,	 is	 as	 unintelligible	 to	 the	 blind,	 as	 the	
manner	 in	which	a	man	may	be	 inspired	with	knowledge	by	
the	Almighty,	is	to	us.14
In	 other	 words,	 all	 manner	 and	 means	 of	 perception	 are	 worthy	
of	 respect	 and	 understanding,	 even	 although	 we	 may	 not	 always	
understand	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 object	 of	 perception.	 Reid	 accepts	 as	
given	 our	 abilities	 to	 build	 experiences	 and	 beliefs	 which	 may	 be	
translated	into	language.	
Wolterstorff	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 his	 book	Thomas Reid and the 
Story of Epistemology	notes	that	Reid	emphasises	the	fact	that	belief	
of	 any	kind	 involves	 judgement.	 For	 a	 belief	 to	 be	 convincing	 and	
coherent	a	person	must	use	his	common	sense	judgement	to	make	a	
convincing	case	for	that	belief.	Wolterstorff	writes:	
…	 does	 Common	 Sense	 consist	 of	 propositions	 judged	 or	
believed	 by	 human	 beings	 in	 common,	 with	 a	 particular	
principle	of	Common	Sense	being	 some	 item	 in	 that	 totality	
of	 shared	 beliefs?	Or	 –	 here’s	 yet	 a	 third	 possibility	 –	 does	
Common	Sense	consist	of	those	shared	faculties	that	produce	
beliefs	we	all	share	in	common?15
In	 response	 to	Wolterstorff	 two	 questions	may	 be	 prompted.	 First,	
is	 language	 the	means	 by	 which	 we	 formulate	 beliefs	 in	 so	 far	 as	
their	existence	depends	upon	social	intercourse?	If	we	are	unable	to	
communicate our beliefs to others they remain untried figments of 
our	imagination	and	as	untested	beliefs	they	cannot	be	the	subject	of	
common	sense.	This	 latter	point	 leads	 to	 the	second	question.	Does	













to	 a	 vacuous	 body.	However,	 we	 can	 now	 see	 that	 any	 speech	 act	
offered	in	a	prayer	to	God	has	reality	and	meaning	for	the	person	or	
congregation	uttering	it.	To	them,	their	speech	is	real	and	the	receptor	
is	 also	 real.	 To	 speak	 to	 God	 is	 absolutely	 coherent	 to	 those	 who	
believe	that	such	communication	is	possible	and	may	indeed	result	in	
a	reply.	Thus	we	come	to	speech	acts	themselves:	Reid	suggests	that	








but	 very	 often	 ‘vulgar’	 prayer	 does	 appeal	 to	 one’s	 baser	 instincts.	
‘If	you	grant	me	success	in	business,	Lord,	I	will	repay	you	in	years	
of	 service.’	 Such	 a	 bargain	 can	 be	made	 in	 prayer	 and	 is	 precisely	





Thus	 we	 have	 the	 three	 elements	 of	 Reid’s	 understanding	 of	






Barth	 is	 stating	a	very	succinct	view	of	 the	 internalist	argument	
of	 Reid.	 He	 is	 suggesting	 that	 God	 can	 only	 be	 understood	 after	
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are regularly made to God, promises of obedience and of fidelity. 







which affirm the Existence and Attributes of the Deity all other 
Existences	 depend	 upon	Will	&	 therefore	 are	 not	 necessary.	
Those	 truths	 that	 relate	 to	 the	 Existence	 of	 a	 Deity	 are	 not	
perhaps to be reckoned first truths but consequences from them 20
In	 this	 quotation,	 Reid	 suggests	 that	 our	 beliefs	 and	 understanding	
of	 the	Deity	 depend	 upon	 our	will	 and	 judgement.	The	 beliefs	 are	
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